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Thailand Digital ID Framework: ETDA, DGA Standards, IAL/AAL Assurance, and Platform Security Verification

The current ETS 11-2566 has three volumes covering the framework, identity proofing and authentication. ETDA Recommendations 18, 19 and 20-2566 were withdrawn on 4 February 2026. Select assurance according to service impact.

Overview
Target Audience
IdPs, RPs and government digital identity services, distinguishing licensed providers and platforms within DPS scope
Testing and Review Frequency
Select schedules under operator-specific rules, policy and risk, with review after material changes. There is no common annual cycle for all services.
Assessment Scope
Identity proofing, authentication, electronic signatures, sessions, tokens and account recovery for the deployed architecture
Relevant Risks
Impersonation, identity data leakage, weak recovery and misapplied regulatory requirements

Distinguish identity proofing from authentication

The current ETS 11-2566 has three volumes covering the framework, identity proofing and authentication. ETDA Recommendations 18, 19 and 20-2566 were withdrawn on 4 February 2026. Select assurance according to service impact.

Identity proofing assurance (IAL): IAL 1, IAL 2.1, IAL 2.2, IAL 2.3, IAL 3
Identity proofing assurance (IAL)

Levels differ in how evidence is checked and how the applicant is linked to the identity.

  • IAL 1
    • Use self-asserted attributes
    • Identity validation is not mandatory
  • IAL 2.1
    • Read the chip or use data from a prior IdP that verified the person at IAL 2.3 or higher
    • Staff compare the face with the chip image or prior IdP image
  • IAL 2.2
    • Add evidence status checks to IAL 2.1
    • Staff compare the face as at IAL 2.1
  • IAL 2.3
    • Read the chip and check evidence status, or follow the permitted route without a reader
    • Compare biometrics with chip data or DOPA FVS
  • IAL 3
    • Read the chip, check evidence status and consult an additional government source
    • Verify face to face and compare biometrics
  • Thai ID at IAL 2.3 without a reader requires DOPA FVS
  • Read passport chips through NFC and apply the checks for the selected level
  • Avoid retaining copies or photos of the back of Thai ID cards
Authentication assurance (AAL): AAL 1, AAL 2, AAL 3
Authentication assurance (AAL)

AAL defines the factors and authenticator properties required for sign-in.

  • AAL 1
    • Use at least one factor, such as a password or OTP
    • Use an authenticated protected channel
  • AAL 2
    • Use at least two distinct factors, such as a password with OTP
    • Use an authenticated protected channel
    • At least one authenticator must resist replay attacks
  • AAL 3
    • Use at least two distinct factors and a hardware-based authenticator
    • Resist replay attacks and IdP impersonation
    • Use channel binding
  • AAL 3 requires verified hardware and cryptographic protocol properties
  • Biometrics must be paired with a device authenticator
  • Phone unlock does not count as an additional authentication factor
Select AAL by impact: Inconvenience and reputation, Financial loss, Operations or public interest, Unauthorized information disclosure, Personal safety, Civil or criminal violations
Select AAL by impact

Assess six impacts of authentication failure.

  • Inconvenience and reputation
    Level 1
    Low
    Level 2
    Moderate
    Level 3
    High
  • Financial loss
    Level 1
    Low
    Level 2
    Moderate
    Level 3
    High
  • Operations or public interest
    Level 1
    None
    Level 2
    Low or Moderate
    Level 3
    High
  • Unauthorized information disclosure
    Level 1
    None
    Level 2
    Low or Moderate
    Level 3
    High
  • Personal safety
    Level 1
    None
    Level 2
    Low
    Level 3
    Moderate or High
  • Civil or criminal violations
    Level 1
    None
    Level 2
    Low or Moderate
    Level 3
    High
  • Assess IAL separately for identity proofing failure
  • Level 2 is not a mandatory baseline for every service
Thailand Digital ID: match standards to the service: Identity proofing: IAL, Authentication: AAL, DGA standards, Test the actual system
Thailand Digital ID: match standards to the service

Distinguish IAL, AAL and DGA standards, then select testing scope and frequency according to service requirements and risk.

  • Identity proofing: IAL — Select assurance for service risk
  • Authentication: AAL — Choose factors and authenticators
  • DGA standards — 1-1 is the overview and 1-2 covers Thai citizens
  • Test the actual system — Verify tokens, sessions and recovery
  • IAL concerns confidence in the claimed identity, covering identity resolution, evidence validation and identity verification at the selected level.
  • IAL 2.1 and 2.2 use staff visual comparison against chip or prior IdP images under the specified conditions. IAL 2.3 uses chip biometrics or DOPA FVS, and the Thai ID route without a reader requires DOPA FVS exclusively.
  • IAL 3 requires face-to-face proofing, Thai ID chip and status checks, an additional government identity source, and biometric comparison against chip data or DOPA FVS under the applicable criteria.
  • ETS 11 Part 2 advises against retaining copies or photos of the back of Thai ID cards to reduce Laser Code exposure, while specifying its use for card status checks in certain proofing methods.
  • AAL 1 requires at least one factor. AAL 2 requires at least two distinct factors and at least one replay-resistant authenticator. AAL 3 adds hardware-based properties and IdP impersonation resistance through channel binding. Biometrics alone do not establish MFA.
  • The ETDA announcement of 4 February 2026 that withdrew Recommendations 18 to 20-2566 states its purpose as having digital identity proofing and authentication service providers and related parties follow the Electronic Transactions Commission announcement of ETS 11-2566. Supervision criteria for licensed identity provider (IdP) businesses under the Digital ID Royal Decree B.E. 2565 are in ETDA Notification Thor Phor Sor 1/2566, which must be checked in its own text. Establish explicit operating boundaries with relying parties (RPs). A relying party is not a certificate authority.

DGA 1-1 is the overview and 1-2 addresses Thai citizens

DGS 1-1:2564 covers the overview of digital identity for government services. DGS 1-2:2564 covers identity proofing and authentication for natural persons with Thai nationality.

  • Use DGS 1-1:2564 to understand roles and relationships. Its discussion of legal persons does not make DGS 1-2:2564 a corporate identity standard.
  • Government service providers should assess service risk and select suitable IAL and AAL, including supported evidence sources and proofing methods.
  • DGA Community Standard 6-4:2566 (v2.0, announcement Mor 3/2566) is an internal DGA guideline on government digital process guidelines, Part 4 standard-level methods, that other agencies may use as an example. Its clause 3.3.4 refers to DGS 1-1:2564 for assessing risk and setting the identity proofing and authentication level of an e-Service, clause 3.3.4 (2) refers to DGS 1-1:2564 and 1-2:2564, and Annex A item 2 sets the e-Service capabilities needed to support identity proofing and authentication.
  • Set evidence retention under the law, regulation and policy applicable to the actual service. This guide does not impose a universal one-year logging period. Licensed IdPs should take their activity-history retention period directly from ETDA Notification Thor Phor Sor 1/2566.
  • Review enrollment, authenticator changes, revocation and account recovery for paths that weaken the intended assurance.

Separate electronic signatures from DPS applicability

ETDA Recommendation 23-2563 provides guidance on electronic signatures. The DPS Royal Decree B.E. 2565 addresses qualifying digital platform services. They do not impose a common penetration-testing cycle on every service.

  • The guidance distinguishes general signatures, reliable signatures, and reliable signatures using a certificate from a certification service provider. Read Sections 9, 26 and 28 in their legal context. Section 28 is not a separate definition of a third signature type.
  • Select a signature method for transaction risk and verify signatory binding, document integrity and certificate trust where certificates are used.
  • Check DPS applicability and any additional duties for platform size or risk. Do not transfer supervised Digital ID provider obligations to every digital platform.
  • Select VA and penetration-testing schedules from the operator-specific requirements, policy and system risk. DPS Sections 19 to 21 do not establish a blanket annual penetration-testing mandate.

Recommended tests for the deployed identity architecture

The following are STH assessment recommendations. Adapt them to deployed protocols, data and authorized scope. They are not quoted statutory requirements.

  • For deployed OAuth 2.0, OIDC or SAML, verify signatures, issuer, audience, redirect URI, state, nonce and replay protection as applicable to the protocol, including the 2018 ETDA OpenID Connect 1.0 technical specification for profile and profile_kyc scopes and Federation Proxy dual signatures.
  • Test sessions, authenticator binding and revocation, step-up authentication and account recovery, including cross-account token misuse, referencing NIST SP 800-63B-4 (July 2025) for phishing-resistant AAL2 and AAL3 authenticators and RP-defined reauthentication limits.
  • Where biometrics are used, assess presentation attacks and privacy for supported methods. Application testing is distinct from biometric product certification.
  • Use synthetic data, verify access boundaries, and retain remediation and retest evidence before acceptance.

References and Assessment Scope

Summary of source references, assessment scope, and review timing in the context of each item.

Reference Topic Assessment Scope Testing Cycle
ETS 11-2566 Parts 1 to 3 Distinguish identity proofing from authentication ETS 11-2566 Part 1 covers the framework, Part 2 identity proofing and Part 3 authentication. Select assurance for service impact; the DOPA FVS-only condition applies to the IAL 2.3 Thai ID route without a reader. According to applicable scope and service risk, not a universal testing cycle
DGS 1-1:2564 and DGS 1-2:2564 DGA 1-1 is the overview and 1-2 addresses Thai citizens DGS 1-1:2564 covers the overview of digital identity for government services. DGS 1-2:2564 covers identity proofing and authentication for natural persons with Thai nationality. According to applicable scope and service risk, not a universal testing cycle
ETDA Recommendation 23-2563 and DPS Royal Decree B.E. 2565 Separate electronic signatures from DPS applicability ETDA Recommendation 23-2563 provides guidance on electronic signatures. The DPS Royal Decree B.E. 2565 addresses qualifying digital platform services. They do not impose a common penetration-testing cycle on every service. According to applicable scope and service risk, not a universal testing cycle
STH assessment recommendations Recommended tests for the deployed identity architecture The following are STH assessment recommendations. Adapt them to deployed protocols, data and authorized scope. They are not quoted statutory requirements. According to applicable scope and service risk, not a universal testing cycle

Implementation Checklist

Select items your organization has completed. The percentage shows selected items only and does not assess security or compliance.

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Key answers and practical guidance addressing common compliance questions.

How do IAL and AAL differ?

IAL concerns confidence in the claimed identity, covering identity resolution, evidence validation and identity verification at the selected level. AAL concerns authentication of an enrolled user. Levels 1, 2 and 3 have different factor and authenticator requirements. A biometric alone does not establish multi-factor authentication.

Does DGS 1-2:2564 cover legal persons?

DGS 1-1:2564 covers the overview of digital identity for government services. DGS 1-2:2564 covers identity proofing and authentication for natural persons with Thai nationality.

Does the DPS decree require annual penetration testing of every platform?

Select VA and penetration-testing schedules from the operator-specific requirements, policy and system risk. DPS Sections 19 to 21 do not establish a blanket annual penetration-testing mandate.

How must e-KYC systems update facial biometric verification when transitioning from ETDA Recommendation 19-2566 to ETS 11 Part 2?

Apply ETS 11 Part 2 Tables 2 and 3 to the deployed proofing method. IAL 2.1 and 2.2 use staff visual comparison under the specified criteria. IAL 2.3 uses chip biometrics or DOPA FVS. The Thai ID route without a reader requires DOPA FVS only. Avoid retaining back-of-card copies or photos.

Does ETS 11 Part 3 specify 30- or 15-minute inactivity timeouts?

ETS 11 Part 3-2566 does not specify these durations. Set session timeouts from applicable service requirements and risk. AAL 2 requires at least one replay-resistant authenticator. AAL 3 adds IdP impersonation resistance.

Official source documents

Current ETS 11-2566 Digital ID standards and supporting official sources

Go to the official source

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